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I. INTRODUCTION
The Boeing Company contracted to build CH-47C "Chinook"
helicopters for the United States Army.' On September 11, 1982,
one of the helicopters which Boeing manufactured crashed at an
air show in Mannheim, West Germany, killing all of the occupants.
A post-accident investigation revealed that clogged oil jets caused
a pinion bearing in the forward rotor transmission to fail. Failure
of the pinion bearing caused play in the aluminum synchronization
shaft (sync shaft) which connects the forward and aft rotors.' The
play caused the sync shaft to rub against Station 120, a cut-out in
the fuselage through which the sync shaft runs. As a result of the
rubbing the sync shaft was severed, desynchronizing the rotors and
causing the forward rotor to strike the aft rotor, knocking it com-
pletely off of the aircraft. The helicopter then fell approximately
700 feet, exploding and burning on impact.3 Families of American
servicemen killed in the crash brought suit against Boeing under
1. Schoenborn v. Boeing Co. (In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim, Germany on Sept.
11, 1982), 586 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1984), rev'd, 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter
cited as Schoenborn ]1.
2. Schoenborn v. Boeing Co. (In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim, Germany on Sept.
11, 1982), 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3330 (U.S. Oct.
22, 1985) (No. 85-703) [hereinafter cited as Schoenborn II]. Because the paths of the for-
ward and aft rotors of the "Chinook" helicopter intersect, it is crucial that they remain
synchronized to avoid contact of the rotors which would result in immediate destruction of
the aircraft. Brief for Appellees at 3-4, Schoenborn II, 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1985).
3. Schoenborn II, 769 F.2d at 118.
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theories of breach of warranty, negligence, and strict liability, and
the district court consolidated the claims.'
After a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs,' the district court
denied a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and
held that the government contractor defense" was unavailable to
Boeing because the government had not established the specifica-
tions for the aircraft's design, but rather had approved Boeing's
specifications.' The court pointed out that the Agent Orange test,8
which the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted in Kout-
soubos v. Boeing Vertol,9 required Boeing to show that: 1) the gov-
ernment had established the specifications for the helicopters, 2)
Boeing manufactured the helicopter to those specifications, and 3)
the government knew as much, or more, than Boeing about the
hazards accompanying the use of the product.'"
Contrary to the circuit court's holding in Koutsoubos, the trial
4. In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim, Germany- On Sept. 11, 1982, 575 F. Supp.
521, 522 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
. The jury answered special interrogatories as follows:
[a.] Was the defendant Boeing-Vertol negligent? [Yes)
b) Was the negligence of Boeing-Vertol a proximate cause of the accident?
[Yes)
[c.] Was the Government's maintenance a superseding cause of the accident?
(No)
Id.) Did the defendant Boeing-Vertol have final control of the design of the air-
craft? [Yes)
(a.] Was the aircraft when delivered by defendant to the Army defective? [Yes]
[f.1 Was the defect a proximate cause of the accident? (Yes)
Scho.nborn I, 769 F.2d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 1985).
6. The government contractor defense, sometimes called the government contract de-
fense, extends sovereign immunity to a government contractor to avoid holding him liable
for the tortious conduct of the government. Although this article deals with the defense as it
applies to military contractors, the defense is also available to nonmilitary contractors, de-
spite different justifications. See Price v. Tempo, 603 F. Supp. 1359 (E.D. Pa. 1985); see also
infra notes 4647, 51 and accompanying text (discussing three policy reasons commonly of-
fered in support of the defense). A similar defense, the contract specification defense, pro-
tects ordinary contractors from liability for damages resulting from products built according
to specifications provided by another party, as long as the specifications are not obviously
dangerous or defective. Conversely, the government contractor defense is available to a
manufacturer who contracts directly with the government even when the specifications are
obviously dangerous or defective. See infra notes 35-36, 41-43 and accompanying text; see
also Note, Liability of a Manufacturer for Products Defectively Designed by the Govern-
ment, 23 B.C.L Rzv. 1025, 1031-64 (1982) (comparing the government contractor defense
with the contract specification defense).
7. Schoenborn I, 586 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1984), rev'd, 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1985).
8. See infro notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
9. 755 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 72 (1985).
10. Schoenborn 1, 586 F. Supp. 711, 717 (E.D. Pa. 1984), rev'd, 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir.
1985).
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court refused to allow government approval of Boeing's specifica-
tions to satisfy the requirement that the government "establish"
the specifications." Because failure to satisfy the first prong of the
test was dispositive of the issue, the court did not deal with the
other two prongs. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held, reversed: Government approval of the manu-
facturer's design, after a substantial review of the specifications, is
sufficient to satisfy the "establishment" requirement, and the rele-
vant knowledge which the government must possess to satisfy the
third prong of the test is knowledge of a defect in an essential or
key component of the mechanism. Schoenborn v. Boeing Co., 769
F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1985).
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR
DEFENSE
The government contractor defense is relatively new to the
area of products liability. 2 Although it originated in public works
cases, courts have extended the scope of the defense to other areas
of law involving government contractors, including the manufac-
turing of military products. 3 As this note will argue, the courts
have overextended the substantive application of the defense to
where it now protects a manufacturer from liability for his own
negligence. Such overextension of the defense is not only unjust to
the plaintiff and society in general, it is extremely dangerous be-
cause it encourages reckless conduct on the part of military
contractors.
The government contractors defense is based on the extension
of the theory of sovereign immunity to government contractors.'
11. Id. at 718.
12. Note, supra note 6, at 1055.
13. See, e.g., Littlehale v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791, 803 & n.17
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967) (mentioning that the defense may be
applicable in a case involving a manufacturer of blasting caps for the military).
14. See Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940) (treating the contractor
as an agent of the government protected by doctrine of sovereign immunity); see also Green
v. ICI Am., Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (allowing contractor to "shae"
the government's sovereign immunity because of the government's high degree of control
over the contractor's TNT plant); cf. Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580, 583 (9th Cir.
1963) (implying that compliance with the government contract immunizes the contractor).
But see Whitaker v. Harvell-Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1969) (stating that
sovereign immunity must be kept in its proper place). Because the defense is an extension
of sovereign immunity, it is only available when the government is immune from liability.
See McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1043 (1984).
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Although sovereign immunity originated from the belief that "the
King can do no wrong,"' 5 the doctrine spread to the United States
when the Supreme Court of the United States adopted it in 1846."'
The doctrine has lead courts to conclude that, in order to govern
effectively, the government must be free from liability to citizens
who are injured by its decisions.'
7
The first case to deal with the government contractor defense
is Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co." In Yearsley, the gov-
ernment selected a contractor to assist in improving the navigabil-
ity of the Missouri River by accelerating erosion on the river
banks. As a result, land owners whose land had partially eroded
away sued the contractor. The court refused to hold the contractor
liable for merely doing what the government contracted him to do,
and implied that the government's immunity extended to the con-
tractor because he was acting as ain agent of the glvernment."9 Al-
though later cases refused to extend the immunity under an
"agency" theory,' 0 the defense continued to exist, and the courts
expanded it into the area of products liability based on principles
of fairness and public policy." Concerns with fairness led courts to
15. Elgin v. District of Columbia, 337 F.2d 152, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1964), quoted in Com-
ment, Agent Orange and the Government Contract Defense: Are Military Manufacturers
Immune from Products Liability?, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 489, 514 (1982). In early England,
those who the king wronged were without a remedy because "the King [could not] be sum-
moned or receive a command from anyone." Federal Legislation: Tort Claims Against The
United States, 30 Gzo. L.J. 462, 462 (1942) (quoting a judgment of the King's Court in 1234,
which was quoted in 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 501
(1895)). In fact, to proceed in his court one had to obtain a writ from the king himself. Id.
16. Note, The Government Contractor Defense and Manufacturers of Military Equip-
ment, 21 Hous. L. Rev. 855, 859 (1984) (construing United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4
How.) 286, 288 (1846)); cf. Comment, supra note 15, at 514 & n.109 (stating that the Su-
preme Court has traditionally been reluctant to allow citizens to sue the government).
17. Elgin v. District of Columbia, 337 F.2d 152, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1964), quoted in Com-
ment, supra note 15, at 514.
18. 309 U.S. 18 (1940).
19. Id. at 21.
20. See Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575 (1943) (prohibiting the extension of
governmental immunity to a contractor under an agency contract); see also Powell v. United
States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 504-08 (1950) (determining that a munitions plant con-
tracting with the government was an independent contractor, not an agent of the govern-
ment, in a suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Whitaker v. Harvell-Kilgore Corp., 418
F.2d 1010, 1015 (5th Cir. 1969) (Where the defendant was a grenade fuse manufacturer who
contracted with the government, the court said that "[defendant] was clearly an indepen-
dent contractor and is not entitled to sovereign immunity.").
21. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 793 (1980), reh'g denied in
port, 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). Tort law in general is based on considerations of
fairness. Although it is often easy to determine which party should be liable, courts are
sometimes faced with situations in which it would be unfair to make either party bear the
[Vol. 40:287
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allow the defense when damages resulted from the contractor's
compliance with the contract.2 2 When the contractor was negligent,
however, the defense was unavailable.23
III. THE Feres/Stencel DOCTRINE
In 1946, Congress limited sovereign immunity by passing the
Federal Tort Claims Act;2' however, some exceptions exist and it is
predominantly from the exception for military personnel that the
government contractor defense has evolved25 In Feres v. United
States, 6 the Supreme Court interpreted the Federal Tort Claims
Act "combatant activities" exception as continuing to prohibit
suits by military personnel against the government for injuries
arising while on active duty.27 Subsequent problems developed
when military personnel were injured as a result of defective prod-
ucts built by a government contractor.
loss. As a result, the court ends up determining which is the more innocent party and at-
taches liability to the other, for example, where the culpable party is insane. See, e.g.,
Jolley v. Powell, 299 So. 2d 647, 648-49 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) (insane person liable for his own
negligence); McGuire v. Almy, 297 Mass. 323, 328, 8 N.E.2d 760, 763 (1937) (insane party
liable for assault and battery); Moore v. Horne, 153 N.C. 413, 414, 69 S.E. 409, 410 (1910)
(holding an insane party civilly liable for torts he commits); see also PRossER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 75 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984) (observing that in strict liability the
burden is placed on the party who can bear it best, according to the exigencies of social
justice).
22. See Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (Law Div. 1976),
aff'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977), cert. denied, 75 N.J. 616, 384 A.2d
846 (1978) (jeep built without seatbelts at government's request), construed in Note, supra
note 6, at 1057; see also Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup.
Ct. 1980) (The manufacturer built a dough mixer according to government specifications for
use in field kitchens.).
23. Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 295 F.2d 14, 16 (9th Cir.
1961) (defense fails if work was improper, careless, or negligent); Green v. ICI Am., Inc., 362
F. Supp. 1263, 1265 (E.D. Tenn. 1973). Unlike a design defect provided by the government,
a manufacturing defect involves the contractor's own negligence and is not protected by the
defense. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1043 (1984).
24. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1982)) (F.T.C.A.). The F.T.C.A. subjects the government to tort
liability for the same reasons ordinary citizens are subject to tort liability.
25. See infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text (discussing the Feres/Stencel doctrine
as a partial justification for the government contractor defense).
26. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
27. Id. at 138, 146 (construing the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1946)).
The Court based its reasoning, in part, on the fact that the government already provided
servicemen with compensation for injuries, regardless of fault. 340 U.S. at 145. See also
Note, Government Contractor Defense to Strict Products Liability, 49 J. AIR L. & Com. 671,
675-79 (1984) (explaining the evolution of Feres and its progeny from the Federal Tort
Claims Act).
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Because neither the soldier nor his family could recover from
the government, they would bring an action against the contractor
who would then try to seek indemnity from the government. The
Supreme Court realized that this resulted in a circumvention of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity as enunciated in Feres. Conse-
quently, the Court ruled, in Stencel Aero Engineering Co. v.
United States,2' that where the government was not liable to the
plaintiff, the Court could not make it liable through indemnifica-
tion of the contractor.'9 This aspect of sovereign immunity which
immunizes the government from liability to the serviceman and
the government contractor commonly has been referred to as the
Feres/Stencel doctrine.30
The area of products liability has been susceptible to claims of
the government contractor defense because of the many products
produced by independent contractors for the military's use. The
inequity of holding contractors liable for defective products which
they did not design is greater when the government compels con-
tractors to produce products at fixed prices during wartime."1 In
this situation, the contractors can neither walk away from a risk
that they do not want to assume, nor increase the contract prices
to cover the expected liability. 2 In addition, the Feres/Stencel
doctrine bans the contractors from seeking indemnification from
the government. As a result, the contractors bear the full responsi-
bility for defective products which they built for the government,
regardless of the facts that they were not negligent at all, that the
government compelled them to produce the product, and that the
government provided the defective design. Although strict liability
often places the loss on a party that was not at fault, one of the
28. 431 U.S. 666, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 882 (1977).
29. Id. at 673-74.
30. See, e.g., Hefley v. Textron, Inc., 713 F.2d 1487 (10th Cir. 1983); Lombard v. United
States, 690 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1118 (1983).
31. During wartime or national emergency the government has broad powers under the
Military Selective Service Act, which allows it to command a manufacturer to produce a
product for the government within a prescribed period of time, for "fair and just compensa.
tion." 50 U.S.C. app. § 468(a)-(d) (1981 & Supp. 1985). If the manufacturer refuses or fails
to comply, the government can seize the plant and operate it for production of the articles.
Id. at § 468(c). In addition, the manufacturer faces possible imprisonment for up to three
years and/or fines up to $50,000 for noncompliance. Id. at § 468(f).
32. The issue, however, of whether compulsion by the government must exist before the
defense applies has met with different responses over the years. Compare Merritt, Chapman
& Scott Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 295 F.2d 14, 16 (9th Cir. 1961) (compulsion required),
discussed in Note, supra note 16, at 869 with Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d
246, 253 (3d Cir. 1982) (compulsion not required).
[Vol. 40:287
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reasons why society can tolerate such liability is that it can shift
the loss to the wrongdoer by indemnification.3 In addition, even
when indemnification is not available, the party bearing all of the
loss often is not totally innocent because he put the defective prod-
uct into the market and, therefore, should suffer the loss instead of
the innocent plaintiff.
3 4
Unfortunately, the Feres/Stencel doctrine prevents indemnifi-
cation even when the government compels the contractor to pro-
duce the product at a fixed price. In this situation, the contractor
resembles the innocent plaintiff in that he was neither at fault nor
able to pass the loss on to anyone else.
IV. THE Agent Orange TEST
Although considerations of fairness and public policy dictated
a need for applying the government contractor defense when the
government compelled the contractor to produce the product
under a fixed price contract, the courts did not fully establish the
parameters of the defense until In re Agent Orange Product Lia-
bility Litigation."' In determining whether the defense was availa-
ble to the manufacturers of a highly toxic defoilant, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the manufacturer had to
show that:
1) the government established the specifications for the
product,
2) the manufactured product met the specifications in all ma-
terial respects, and
3) the government knew as much or more than the manufac-
33. See Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 97, 179 N.W.2d 64, 72 (1970)
(discussing a "passive" tortfeasor's ability to indemnify against an "active" tortfeasor in
strict liability); cf. Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel (Strict Liability To The Con-
sumer), 69 YALs LJ. 1099, 1123-24 (1960) (stating that in a warranty action indemnification
through each supplier in the chain of distribution is costly and that direct actions against
the manufacturers should replace indemnification). See generally Paosamu AM) KEEroN ON
TsE LAW or ToRTs, supra note 21, at 341-45 (discussing the availability of indemnity).
34. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901 (1963)
("The purpose of (strict] liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defec-
tive products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather
than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves."); cf. RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) oF ToRTs § 402A comment c (1965) (stating that by marketing the product the
manufacturer has assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the community
who is injured by it). For an example of a court's attempt to claim that servicemen do not
rely on such an "implied representation," see infra note 70 (discussing implied representa-
tion and quoting McKay v. Rockwell Intl Corp., 704 F.2d. 444, 453 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
35. 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
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turer about the hazards to people that accompanied use of the
product.
3a
Because the purpose of the first prong, the "establishment prong,"
is to avoid imposing liability on a contractor who merely supplied
the government with a weapon that the government required, the
government must have "established the design and specific charac-
teristics."3 If, however, the government only set forth "perform-
ance specifications," the court emphasized that the defense would
be far more restricted."
The second prong of the test requires a comparison of the
"characteristics and quality of the product" with the government's
specifications.2 ' The defense would fail if material discrepancies
existed.'0
The last prong of the test, the "knowledge prong," imposes on
the manufacturer a duty to warn the government of hazards which
the manufacturer knows are associated with use of the product."1
The warnings must be such that the government has equal or
greater knowledge of the hazards involved. If the manufacturer has
more knowledge than the government, then it has not given ade-
quate warnings and the defense will fail."
The "knowledge prong" is crucial because it allows the govern-
36. Id. at 1055. The court also rejected compulsion as a requirement of the defense.
37. Id. at 1056.
38. Id. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals categorizes government specifi-
cations into three groups: (1) Design specifications-stating "precise measurements, toler-
ances, materials, in-process and finished product tests, quality control and inspection re-
quirements and other information." Comment, Strict Product Liability Suits for Design
Defects in Military Products: All the King's Men; All the King's Privileges?, 10 U. DAYToN
L Rzv. 117, 120 n.13 (1984) (quoting Aerodex Inc., 1962 B.C.A. (CCH) 3492, at 17,822,
rev'd on other grounds, 417 F.2d 1361 (Ct. Cl. 1969). (2) Performance speciflcations--stating
performance characteristics desired from a product (i.e. top speed, maximum range, and
capacity for an airplane). Comment, supra note 38 at 120 n.13 (citing 1962 B.C.A. 3492, at
17,822). The contractor would have "general responsibility for the design." Id. (quoting 1962
B.C.A. 1 3492, at 17,822). (3) Purchase description-(i.e. brand name, model number). Com-
ment, supra note 38, at 120 n.13 (citing 1962 B.C.A. 1 3492, at 17,822). When dealing with a
performance specification, the government is not providing the specifications, but rather
allowing the contractor to design a product to perform in the manner that the government
wants. Needless to say, if in this situation the design is defective, then the contractor is not
the innocent party that he would be if the government provided the specifications; there-
fore, the "establishment prong's" function is to allow the defense when the government, and
not the contractor, is at fault.
39. 534 F. Supp. at 1057.
40. Id. This portion of the test is seldom in dispute. Nonetheless, whether the defect is
in the manufacture or in the design of the product is important because the defense only
protects the latter. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
41. 534 F. Supp. at 1057.
42. Id. at 1057-58.
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ment to weigh the risks involved against the need for the product,
and to make an intelligent determination of whether it should use
the product.4 3 Because the manufacturer typically has a financial
interest in the continued use of the product, however, the courts
should carefully watch the "knowledge prong" to assure strict com-
pliance with the "equal or greater knowledge" requirement, and to
prevent an unscrupulous manufacturer from failing to adequately
disclose the hazards of the product to the government. One prob-
lem that arises from the "knowledge prong" of the Agent Orange
test is, by attaching liability for what the manufacturer knew but
failed to disclose, the court encourages manufacturers to know as
little as possible about their products.4' The better standard would
be to hold the manufacturer liable for what he knew or should
have known, based on his skill and expertise in the area. The
"should know" standard would impose on the manufacturer a
higher duty to warn the government, which has less expertise, of
any hazards in the product. 45 As a result of Agent Orange, when
the government gives a contractor specifications for a product, if
the contractor builds the product to those specifications and warns
the government of any hazards it knows to be associated with the
product, then the contractor is immune from liability for injuries
resulting from the product.
In support of the government contractor defense, the Agent
Orange court pointed out that, for prophylactic effect, tort liability
should rest on the wrongdoer, who is in a position to correct the
wrong," and that, without the defense, contract prices would in-
crease and render "governmental immunity" meaningless by cir-
cumventing the Feres/Stencel doctrine." Interestingly, the govern-
43. Id. at 1057. The Agent Orange test is similar to the risk/utility analysis courts use
in ordinary negligence theory and to Judge Learned Hand's risk-benefit equation. See
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947), reh'g denied, 160 F.2d
482 (1947) (discussing the balancing of the probability of harm and the extent of injury
against the burden of taking adequate precautions, and formulating an algebraic equation
(B<PL) to reflect the proper balance for liability to attach to the burdened party). The
entity most concerned with reaching a balanced outcome, here the government not the
profit-minded manufacturer, must compare opposing interests.
44. Note, supro note 6, at 1078-79.
45. Id. at 1079.
46. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 793-94 (1980), reh'g denied
in part, 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
47. Id. at 794; see also Comment, supra note 29, at 136 & nn.137-38 (citing cases which
argue that costs will rise due to either unavailability of insurance or its increased cost). But
see id. at 136-37 (Recent studies show, however, that the existence of the government con-
tractor defense has little effect on manufacturer's insurance rates.).
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ment apparently believes that the contractor is in a position to
correct the wrong, or at least to make the wrong worse if given
blanket immunity. When contractors have sought indemnification
clauses or statutory immunity the government has opposed it, ar-
guing that broader protection for contractors would reduce their
economic incentive to design and produce the safest possible
products.
46
Although other reasons may justify the defense, the belief
that, absent the defense, contractors will circumvent governmental
immunity by increasing contract prices does not take into consid-
eration the fact that the government awards most contracts under
a bidding system which allows the free market to regulate the price
so that contractors with safe records will not have any additional
costs to pass on to the government, and will be able to provide
safer products at cheaper prices.' Also, the defense does not pro-
tect manufacturers from damages caused by manufacturing defects
and, other than the free market system, nothing else prevents
manufacturers from passing those costs off to the government." In
addition, the threat of increased government contract prices, which
the contractors claim will circumvent the Feres/Stencel doctrine,
was just as much of a threat when the Stencel Court decided to
prevent indemnification against the government. Yet, there is no
evidence that contract prices rose as a result of Stencel when con-
tractors bore the entire risk of liability. No reason suggests why
the situation will be any different if the courts limit or even abol-
ish the defense, which has developed since Stencel.1
48 Comment, supra note 38, at 124, 143-44; see also Comment, The Government Con-
tract Defense in Strict Liability Suits for Defective Design, 48 U. CHL L Rzv. 1030, 1048-49
(1981) (suggesting that the contractor is the person most able to increase deterrence by
demanding indemnity clauses, agreements to pay insurance, and other favorable provisions).
49. See McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 457 (9th Cir. 1983) (Alarcon, J.,
disseting), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); see also, Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
696 F.2d 246, 254 n.16 (1982) (quoting Comment, Requests for Proposals in State Govern-
ment Procurement, 130 U. PA. L Rev. 179, 181 (1981): "In 1980, '85-90% of all federal
contract dollars... were let through negotiated procurements' "); see also Comment, supra
note 48, at 137 (contractors admit that they are unable to shift increased costs to the
government).
50. See Comment, supra note 48, at 134 (citing Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp.
351 (D. Kan. 1983)); see also supra note 23 and accompanying text (pointing out that the
defense does not protect contractors for injuries caused by manufacturing defects).
51. On the other hand, if manufacturers are given too much protection from liability,
costs, as measured in lives and equipment, will surely rise. Brief for Appellee at 29 n.16,
Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., No. 84-5803 (11th Cir. 1985); cf. Stencel Aero Eng'g Co.
v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 674 n.8 (1977) (implicitly recognizing that actions against a
military contractor are proper because the contractor has had sufficient notice to take into
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As a third policy reason for the defense, the court stated that
the judiciary should not become involved in second-guessing the
military on military decisions.5 ' Although generally true, this argu-
ment ignores the fact "that not all decisions regarding the design
of military equipment involve military judgments."53 The military
may have its reasons for leaving seatbelts out of its jeeps" or for
designing machines for its field kitchens in a way that would be
unreasonably dangerous in the normal market," however, no mili-
tary decision exists when the government does not tell the manu-
facturer to build the product according to a particular design.
Where discretion exists, it is not a military decision."
Nonetheless, the Agent Orange test serves an important func-
tion: it limits the availability of the government contractor defense
to situations where the contractor merely supplied the government
with the product which it requested and where the contractor was
neither involved in the design of the product, nor negligent in its
manufacture. Unfortunately, expansion of the Agent Orange test
in recent cases has provided government contractors with a "wind-
fall" and defeated one of the main policy reasons for the defense
by causing innocent plaintiffs to bear the entire loss for something
that they could not have prevented."
V. UNWARRANTED EXPANSION OF THE Agent Orange TEST
Despite the fact that the Agent Orange court emphasized the
account the risk of not being able to get indemnification from the government).
52. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1054 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
53. Schoenborn 1, 586 F. Supp. 711, 718 (E.D. Pa. 1984), rev'd, 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir.
1985).
54. See, Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (Law Div. 1976),
alf'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977), cert. denied, 75 N.J. 616, 384 A.2d
846 (1978) (jeep built without seatbelts at government's request because seatbelts would be
dangerous in battlefield conditions).
55. Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1980)
(dough mixer manufactured according to government specifications for use in field
kitchens).
56. Note, The Government Contract Defense: Should Manufacturer Discretion Pre-
clude Its Availability?, 37 Mz. L. REv. 187, 201 (1985) ("The existence of manufacturer
discretion demonstrates that the military has made no decision as to the ultimate design of
the particular aspect of the product involved."); see also, McKay v. Rockwell Intl Corp.,
704 F.2d 444, 460 (9th Cir. 1983) (Alarcon, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984)
(argument that it would involve second guessing military orders would also be present if
injured civilian sued, but the Feres/Stencel doctrine does not bar such a suit).
57. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (noting that in order to have a deterrent
effect the court must place liability on the party who is in a position to correct the tortious
wrong).
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importance of a manufacturer's inability to negotiate specifications
and contract prices or terms," courts recently have applied the
three-prong test in these situations, regardless of such crucial is-
sues as the extent of the contractor's involvement in the design of
the product. In McKay v. Rockwell International Corp.,"9 a case
involving a faulty ejection system designed by a contractor for use
in a military airplane, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Agent Orange
test; but its version of the first prong was critically different than
the one it claimed to adopt. The court stated that government "ap-
proval" of the specifications was sufficient to satisfy the require-
ment that the specifications be governmentally "established." 60
Although seemingly a harmless change, it completely under-
mined the effectiveness of the Agent Orange test because manufac-
turers could now defectively design a product and escape liability
for their own negligence by slipping the defect past the less knowl-
edgeable government inspectors. It seems illogical to allow the
manufacturer to shift the responsibility for a defect-free product to
the government, who has no fear of liability and less expertise.
Ironically, the court points out that the defense does not protect
contractors for a product which they negligently manufactured. 1
Yet it fails to explain why the defense protects contractors for neg-
ligently designing a product, when a design defect is more danger-
ous than a manufacturing defect because it is more likely to repeat
itself. Consequently, under the McKay test, manufacturers can es-
cape liability for many defects which the government cannot find
by testing but which develop with time as a result of the improper
design.6" To support its version of the defense, the McKay court
offered the same policy reasons as in Agent Orange." Furthermore,
the court argued that war sometimes requires the United States to
push technology to its limits and, thereby, incur risks which would
58. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 794 (1980), rev'd. on
other grounds, 635 F.2d 987 (1980).
59. 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
60. Id. at 451. The court also explicitly provided in its test that the government must
be immune for the defense to apply. Id.
61. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1043 (1984).
62. The clogged lubrication jets and inadequate shaft clearance in Schoenborn are ex-
amples of such defects. See infra note 74 and accompanying text. Fortunately, some courts
have declined to follow McKay. See, e.g., Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d
1036 (5th Cir. 1984), cited in Brief for Appellee at 21, Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.,
No. 84-5803 (11th Cir. 1985) (listing cases which reject McKay); Johnston v. United States,
568 F. Supp. 351 (D. Kan. 1983).
63. See aupra notes 46-47, 51 and accompanying text.
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otherwise be unacceptable. 4 The Manhattan Project, which lead to
the discovery of the atomic bomb, is an example of this. 5 Needless
to say, such situations are not very common.
Lastly, the court stated that its new version of the defense en-
courages a close working relationship between the government and
the contractor,"6 but the court did not explain what benefit that
would have. If the assumption is that close work between the gov-
ernment and contractor leads to safer products, then the court
may have little basis for its argument. Two parties who face no
liability would hardly have more incentive to build safer products
than one who does not have such immunity.
In Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol,76 the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit adopted McKay's version of the test, and also
claimed that if any involvement by the contractor defeated the de-
fense, then "there would be no incentive for contractors to work
closely with the military .... " The court failed to realize that its
concern should be on what it is trying to encourage-safe prod-
ucts-not on a close working relationship with the government, un-
less a close working relationship is instrumental in obtaining safe
products. In Koutsoubos, it was not. The court found that there
had been a "back and forth" discussion between the Navy and
Boeing about the specifications, yet Boeing still manufactured a
defective helicopter and two servicemen died as a result.68
Nonetheless, by adopting the defense as set out in McKay, the
court gave additional strength to a version of the defense which its
original authors in the public works cases could never have envi-
sioned,6' and which flies in the face of established policy reasons
for strict liability.70 Yet, despite the damage done by McKay to the
64. McKay v. Rockwell Intl Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 450 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1043 (1984).
65. See Comment, supra note 15, at 523-26 (discussing the need to extend beyond the
limits of modern technology during wartime).
66. McKay, 704 F.2d.at 450.
67. 755 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 72 (1985).
68. Id. at 353-54.
69. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text. The original intent behind the gov-
ernment contractor defense was to avoid making innocent contractors bear the loss for a
defective product of government design and compelled production, and not to give govern-
ment contractors an immunity unparalleled in other areas of tort law.
70. There are four major policy reasons for strict liability- enterprise liability, market
deterrence, compensation, and implied representation. See Note, Protecting the Buyer of
Used Products: Is Strict Liability for Commercial Sellers Desirable?, 33 STAN. L. REV. 535,
536 (1981). The theory behind enterprise liability is that the price of the product rises as
costs increase due to accidents. The purchaser then is able to choose the less expensive,
safer, products over the costly, high risk products. Although this purpose is still served in
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Agent Orange test, the "knowledge prong" still restricted
contractors.
In Schoenborn I, the trial court reviewed McKay's reasons for
supporting the "approval" standard, then, rejecting it, refused to
allow government "approval" of Boeing's helicopter specifications
the area of military products, the "approval" standard's overly broad protection subverts it.
See supro note 49 and accompanying text. Market deterrence is simila to enterprise liabil-
ity but the effect is on the seller. Market deterrence encourages sellers to avoid increased
costs and resulting lower profits by building safer products. Because government contractors
have as much or more of a profit motive than other contractors, market deterrence ordina-
rily is-as effective in the military product marketplace. By allowing manufacturers to avoid
liability through government approval of their product, however, market deterrence is lost.
Although the Veteran's Benefits Act compensates servicemen and their families, the
compensation they receive is less than they would under a strict liability recovery. Cf. Mc-
Kay v. Rockwell Intl Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 452 (9th Cir. 1983) (Alarcon, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984) (arguing that while compensation would be greater with strict
liability, servicemen did not anticipate such an increase at the time of enlistment). It might
be observed that these servicemen probably did not anticipate being treated as second class
citizens and subjected to defective equipment without a hope of recovering damages for it.
Lastly, the implied representation that a marketed product, if put to its intended use,
will not be unreasonably dangerous is still present whether the market is the military or the
regular marketplace. In McKay, the court argued that the implied representation does not
exist for servicemen because "[t]hey recognize when they join the armed forces that they
may be exposed to grave risks of danger, such as having to bail out of a disabled aircraft."
McKay v. Rockwell Intl Corp., 704 F.2d 444,463 (9th Cir. 1983)Icert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043
(1984). That reasoning is specious and it degrades servicemen to second class citizens. Fol-
lowed to its logical conclusion, that reasoning suggests that it would be acceptable to give a
police officer a defective patrol car because he recognized the danger of his job when he
became a police officer.
A soldier anticipates risks associated with war and the enemy, not defective products.
As Judge Alarcon stated in his McKay dissent: "It is the Military's, [the contractor's] and
this court's duty to insure that our servicemen are provided with reliable and safe equip-
ment." McKay v. Rockwell Intl Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 461 (9th Cir. 1983) (Alarcon, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); see also Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 502
F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974):
In making the grenade and its component parts the defendants knew that it
was made for military personnel and that it was to be used by them. We believe
the public interest in human life and health requires the protection of the law
against the manufacture of defective explosives, whether they are to be used by
members of the public at large or members of the public serving in our armed
forces.
Id. at 871.
The defense is available for actions based on strict liability, negligence, and warranty.
In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1055-56 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); see also
Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246, 251-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (exploring the availa-
bility of the defense in all three circumstances under Pennsylvania law). Extension of the
government contractor defense, however, to allow immunity if the product meets with gov-
ernment approval, circumvents the policy reasons for strict liability without a sufficient rea-
son to do so. But see McKay, 704 F.2d at 451-53 (stating that policy reasons for strict
liability are not circumvented in cases involving injuries resulting from military products).
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to satisfy the "establishment" prong.7' The trial court decided
against allowing the defense because the government had only pro-
vided Boeing with "performance specifications. 72 Because the ex-
istence of "performance specifications" indicates that Boeing and
not the Army designed the helicopter, the "establishment prong"
could not be satisfied without the court accepting McKay's "ap-
proval" standard. As a result, the government contractor defense
was not available and the jury found Boeing negligent in the de-
sign of the helicopter.73
It is in cases such as Schoenborn that the weakness of the "ap-
proval" standard becomes apparent. Although rigorous testing may
detect certain defects such as sluggish handling or nonconformance
with the performance specifications, it would not detect a problem
which, although present in the design, only becomes apparent with
time, and then, only for a few minutes before the inevitable de-
struction of the helicopter and its occupants. Examination of the
specifications by the less experienced government would not detect
the inadequate clearance at Station 120,7' and bearing failure due
to oil starvation is something which, if at all detectable prior to its
occurrence, would have to be within the expertise of the contrac-
tor. The shift of responsibility from the contractor to the govern-
ment which results from acceptance of the "approval" standard
places the burden of detecting such a defect on the party least able
and with the least incentive to do so.75 Nonetheless, on appeal, the
circuit court upheld the "approval" standard created by McKay
and adopted in Koutsoubos and went on to examine the other
prongs of the test.7 e Plaintiffs argued that Boeing had not satisfied
71. Schoenborn I, 586 F. Supp. at 717-18 ("We are holding that where a contractor
establishes a product's detailed specifications and the government merely approves them,
the government contractor defense is not available to the contractor.").
72. Id. at 715-16; see supra note 38 and accompanying text (distussing why perform-
ance specifications are not sufficient to entitle the manufacturer to the protections of the
defense).
73. See supra note 5.
74. The clearance at Station 120 becomes a problem only when bearing failure occurs.
One defect intensifies the other. At trial, Mr. Coronato, an expert witness, testified that if
the sync shaft were made of steel, rather than aluminum, the pilot, who was 30-60 seconds
away from landing, would have had an "additional 15-30 minutes of survivability," despite
the inadequate clearance. Brief for Appellee at 23, Schoenborn I1, 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir.
1985); see supro notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing how friction at Station 120
results in severence of the sync shaft and destruction of the aircraft).
75. The government is already absolved from liability in this situation, therefore, it
does not have the added incentive of fearing liability to drive it toward assuring that the
product is defect free.
76. Because refusal to accept the "approval" standard was dispositive of the test at the
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the "knowledge prong" and offered evidence" to show that Boeing
knew that bearing failure caused the sync shaft to rub at Station
120 in two prior accidents.78 This rubbing caused the severance of
the aluminum sync shaft in a matter of minutes, followed by the
immediate destruction of the helicopter; yet, Boeing had not noti-
fied the Army of the full extent of the hazard. Boeing had only
warned the Army that bearing failure had caused the prior acci-
dents and proposed modifications to correct the defect or warn of
its presence. 7" This raises a question about the adequacy of Boe-
ing's warning to the government. Agent Orange, McKay, and
Koutsoubos, on which this court relied, had already set the stan-
dard for adequacy by requiring that the government know as much
or more than the manufacturer about the hazards of the product so
that it could balance the risks and benefits involved. To what avail
was Boeing's recommendation that the government install a chip
detector for an earlier warning of bearing failure,80 if Boeing did
not tell the government how much time the pilot would have be-
tween bearing failure and destruction of the aircraft? In Berkebile
v. Brantly Helicopter Corp.," the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held that it is a question for the jury whether the warnings about
the amount of time necessary for the helicopter pilot to achieve
auto-rotation were sufficient to apprise the pilot of the dangers of
delay and whether the warnings were adequate enough to convey
the urgency of the situation and the need to react almost instanta-
trial court level and because the "establishment prong" was not met, the trial court did not
address the other prongs of the test.
77. Plaintiffs presented an internal memo from Boeing to show that Boeing had with-
held information from the Army.
78. See Brief for Appellee at 7, Schoenborn 11, 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1985). One of the
prior accidents occurred in Vietnam in 1966 and resulted from sync shaft failure like the
Schoenborn accident. As a result of the 1966 accident, an investigation by Boeing revealed
that displacement of the pinion shaft by only two degrees would result in sync shaft failure;
but this information was only kept in an internal memo which was not given to the Army.
79. Boeing did not warn the Army of any hazards at all until after two accidents had
occurred, at which time Boeing proposed modifications to correct the defect. The Army
adopted five of six proposed modifications prior to the accident at Mannheim. The only
modification rejected, inserting a screen in the oil line prior to the point where the oil jets
become clogged, was too costly to implement. This begs the question why should the Army
have to pay to eliminate a defective condition caused by the contractor? If this is a result of
the government's "approval" of the product, it conflicts with the principle that the "duty to
provide a non-defective product is non-delegable." Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 741
F.2d 656, 659 (1984) (quoting Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d
893 (1975)).
S0. This was referred to in the trial court as Engineering Change Proposal # 153.
81. 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
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neously8 2 Although here the judge decided the question as part of
deciding the applicability of the defense, it is clear that the govern-
ment did not have as much knowledge of the hazard as the manu-
facturer. As a result, despite the circuit court's own finding that
the contract contained more than just "performance specifica-
tions," and its continued support of the useless "approval" stan-
dard, the defense should have failed because the government did
not have equal or greater knowledge of the hazards of the product
as required by the third prong. Absent complete knowledge of the
hazard, including the dangers of delay, the government did not
have the full picture necessary for an informed balancing of risks
and benefits.
5 3
Nonetheless, the circuit court applied the government contrac-
tor defense and held that the relevant knowledge required by the
"knowledge prong" is "knowledge of a defect in an essential or key
component of the mechanism.""' In so ruling, the court completely
changed the test so that now the government need not have equal
or greater knowledge of the hazard as long as it knows of a defect
in a key component. Besides the fact that what is a "key compo-
nent" remains subject to case by case determination, the modified
test does not even encourage manufacturers to work closely with
the government in designing a product because, now that their
duty to warn is little more than a formality, their standard of lia-
bility is considerably less. In seeking to prevent contractors from
passing on increased contract costs to the government, the court
has condemned society to pay an even greater price, the kind that
is paid with people's lives.85 Granting such an expansive immunity
to government contractors can only promote reckless conduct, and,
although recklessness is dangerous in any sector of Society, such
behavior is particularly hazardous in the area of military
products."
82. Id. at 100-04, 337 A.2d at 902-03.
83. The Agent Orange court set a high standard requiring absolute disclosure in order
to maintain tight control over an otherwise dangerous immunity. If manufacturers are al-
lowed to stray from that standard, then the effective limitations created by the Agent Or-
ange court will be lost in constant disputes over what constitutes adequate knowledge.
84. Schoenborn H1, 769 F.2d 115, 125 (3d Cir. 1985) (In this case the court felt that the
"key component" was the entire transmission.).
85. See Brief for Appellee at 11, Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., No. 84-5803 (11th
Cir. 1985).
86. With this country's ever increasing supply of nuclear weapons, courts should be
demanding more care rather than less from military contractors. Now, in an effort to cut
costs, contractors will- undoubtedly take higher risks than they would if faced with greater
liability; but the real risks will be borne by us all. Cf. Pratt, Catastrophic Nuclear Power
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Although the Agent Orange test suffered a blow as a result of
the "approval" standard, this interpretation of the "knowledge
prong" has destroyed the purpose of the defense. The court has
overextended the government contractor defense to a point where
it no longer serves its originally intended purpose. The defense was
originally an equitable measure intended to prevent the court from
imposing liability on an innocent contractor who, absent his rela-
tionship with the government, the court would not force to bear
the loss. Government contractors can now escape their proper
share of liability because the defense is no longer closely tailored to
serve its intended purpose. Hopefully, other courts will see the in-
equity and refuse to extend Agent Orange as far as have McKay,
Koutsoubos, and Schoenborn. These decisions have exaggerated
and shifted from the contractor, who is now not so innocent, to the
innocent plaintiff the unfairness that existed in a few isolated situ-
ations . Although primarily based on reasons of fairness, the cur-
rent effect of the defense is to grant government contractors an
undeserved immunity from liability, while other contractors carry
their share of the cost to society of defective products and innocent
plaintiffs bear a loss that is not rightfully theirs.
Even if other courts take action to limit the expansion of the
defense, however, corrective action is necessary to repair the dam-
age that McKay, Koutsoubo8 and Schoenborn have done. Although
the McKay and Schoenborn courts claimed that they were in
agreement with the Agent Orange court and purported to adopt
the Agent Orange test, each court altered the test materially and,
as a result, the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits are not in har-
mony on how to apply the government contractor defense. In addi-
tion, other circuits are relying on these cases in applying the de-
fense;" this disharmony will undoubtedly lead to growth in the
disparity between the circuits concerning use of the government
contractor defense unless the Supreme Court of the United States
acts to standardize its application."
Reactor Accidents: An Issue of Safety, A Question of Record, 14 GA. L. Rav. 265 (1980)
(discussing risks associated with nuclear reactors manufactured by contractors under gov-
ernment regulation and operated by utility companies); Note, Transportation of Nuclear
Material: The Public Challenge, 11 RTrr.-CA LJ. 63 (1979) (examining risks associated
with transportation of nuclear materials (often by common carrier)).
87. See, e.g., Tillett v. J.1. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 596 (7th Cir. 1985) (following
McKay).
88. On October 22, 1985, the plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari in the Schoenborn
case. Perhaps the Supreme Court of the United States will see the importance of promptly
limiting the availability of the government contractor defense and will take steps to uni.
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VI. PROPOSAL FOR LIMITATION OF THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR
DEFENSE
In creating a government contractor defense, courts attempt to
strike a balance between overly burdening the manufacturer and
leaving innocent plaintiffs vulnerable. The closest they have come
to striking a proper balance is the Agent Orange test. The Agent
Orange court properly molded this test to protect the manufac-
turer who does everything he can to avoid placing a defective prod-
uct on the market. On the other hand, a manufacturer who has not
taken the extra steps to warn the government and protect society
from a dangerous product which he manufactured cannot rely on
the defense because the loss would then fall on the plaintiff who
could not have prevented it. 9
The only change that courts need to make to the Agent Or-
ange test is that courts must hold manufacturers to a "should
know" standard in the "knowledge prong" to encourage them to
learn as much as possible about their products." If a manufacturer
has built a product to government established specifications, con-
struing "established" in the strictest sense,"' and has notified the
government in full of any hazards associated with the product of
which he knows or should know, then he should be entitled to the
protection of the government contractor defense. This compen-
sates the contractor for his inability to obtain indemnification from
the government.
If this proposal appears to almost abolish the government con-
tractor defense, it is because the defense should, at the very least,
be severely limited. Government contractors, like ordinary contrac-
tors, are in business to earn a profit. They cannot expect to go
about collecting their profits and avoiding all liability because their
client is the United States Government. When, however, as a result
of war, the government compels contractors to design and manu-
facture a product under a fixed price contract or requires contrac-
tors to push technology to its limits, 2 society, through its courts,
should entitle contractors to protection from liability through what
may amount to a fourth prong in the Agent Orange test.
formly reduce its application.
89. This encourages the profit-minded manufacturer to report the product's hazards to
the government.
90. See supra note 44-45 and accompanying text.
91. This means that the government must have provided the specifications for the
product, and the contractor had no involvement in the design of the product.
92. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
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Absent the exigencies of war, if a manufacturer finds a risk too
high, then he can pass up the contract. If the government deems it
necessary, it can include an indemnification clause in the contract,
and thus, relieve the manufacturer of the loss. Otherwise, a govern-
ment contractor should be subject to the same benefits, liabilities,
and risks as the rest of us; no more, no less.
ALEx FERRER*
* To Jane for her love, support and typing. Special thanks to all members of the Ra-
vmw for their assistance in bringing this article to publication.
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